Abstract-Log-linear learning has been extensively studied in the game-theoretic and distributed control literature. It is appealing for many applications because it often guarantees that the agents' collective behavior will converge in probability to the optimal system configuration. However, the worst case convergence time can be prohibitively long, that is, exponential in the number of players. Building upon the 2010 work of Shah and Shin, we formalize a modified log-linear learning algorithm whose worst case convergence time is roughly linear in the number of players. We prove this characterization for a class of potential games where agents' utility functions can be expressed as a function of aggregate behavior within a finite collection of populations. Finally, we show that the convergence time remains roughly linear in the number of players even when the players are permitted to enter and exit the game over time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
G AME-THEORETIC learning algorithms have gained traction as a design tool for distributed control systems [9] , [11] , [18] , [24] , [26] . Here, a static game is repeated over time, and agents revise their strategies based on their objective functions and on observations of other agents' behavior. Emergent collective behavior for such revision strategies has been studied extensively in the literature, for example, fictitious play [8] , [16] , [19] ; regret matching [13] ; and log-linear learning [1] , [5] , [23] . Although many of these learning rules have desirable asymptotic guarantees, their convergence times either remain uncharacterized or are prohibitively long [7] , [12] , [14] , [23] . Characterizing convergence rates is key to determining whether a distributed algorithm is desirable for system control.
In many multiagent systems, the agent objective functions can be designed to align with the system-level objective func- tion, yielding a potential game [20] whose potential function is precisely the system objective function. Here, the optimal collective behavior of a multiagent system corresponds to the Nash equilibrium that optimizes the potential function. Hence, learning algorithms, which converge to this efficient Nash equilibrium, have proven useful for distributed control.
Log-linear learning is one algorithm that accomplishes this task [5] . Log-linear learning is a perturbed best reply process where agents predominantly select the optimal action given their beliefs about other agents' behavior; however, the agents occasionally make mistakes, selecting suboptimal actions with a probability that decays exponentially with respect to the associated payoff loss. As noise levels approach zero, the resulting process has a unique stationary distribution with full support on the efficient Nash equilibria. By designing agents' objective functions appropriately, log-linear learning can be used to define distributed control laws which converge to optimal steadystate behavior in the long run.
Unfortunately, worst-case convergence rates associated with log-linear learning are exponential in the game size [23] . This stems from inherent tension between desirable asymptotic behavior and convergence rates. The tension arises because small noise levels are necessary to ensure that the mass of the stationary distribution lies primarily on the efficient Nash equilibria; however, small noise levels also make it difficult to exit inefficient Nash equilibria, degrading convergence times.
Positive convergence rate results for log-linear learning and its variants are beginning to emerge for specific game structures [2] , [15] , [21] , [23] . For example, in [21] , the authors study the convergence rates of log-linear learning for a class of coordination games played over graphs. They demonstrate that underlying convergence rates are desirable, provided that the interaction graph and its subgraphs are sufficiently sparse. Alternatively, in [23] , the authors introduce a variant of loglinear learning and show that convergence times grow roughly linearly in the number of players for a special class of congestion games over parallel networks. They also show that convergence times remain linear in the number of players when players are permitted to exit and enter the game. Although these results are encouraging, the restriction to parallel networks is severe and hinders the applicability of such results to distributed engineering systems.
We focus on identifying whether the positive convergence rate results above extend beyond symmetric congestion games over parallel networks to games of a more general structure relevant to distributed engineering systems. Such guarantees are not automatic because there are many simplifying attributes 2325-5870 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
associated with symmetric congestion games that do not extend in general (see Example 2) . The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We formally define a subclass of potential games, called semi-anonymous potential games, which are parameterized by populations of agents where each agent's objective function can be evaluated using only information regarding the agent's own decision and the aggregate behavior within each population. Agents within a given population have identical action sets, and their objective functions share the same structural form. The congestion games studied in [23] could be viewed as a semianonymous potential game with only one population.
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• We introduce a variant of log-learning learning that extends the algorithm in [23] . In Theorem 1, we prove that the convergence time of this algorithm grows roughly linearly in the number of agents for a fixed number of populations. This analysis explicitly highlights the potential impact of system-wide heterogeneity, that is, agents with different action sets or objective functions, on the convergence rates. Furthermore, in Example 4, we demonstrate how a given resource allocation problem can be modeled as a semianonymous potential game.
• We study the convergence times associated with our modified log-linear learning algorithm when the agents continually enter and exit the game. In Theorem 2, we prove that the convergence time of this algorithm remains roughly linear in the number of agents provided that the agents exit and enter the game at a sufficiently slow rate.
The forthcoming analysis is similar in structure to the analysis presented in [23] . We highlight the explicit differences between the two proof approaches throughout, and directly reference lemmas within [23] when appropriate. The central challenge in adapting and extending the proof in [23] to the setting of semianonymous potential games is dealing with the growth of the underlying state space. Note that the state space in [23] is characterized by the aggregate behavior of a single population while the state space in our setting is characterized by the Cartesian product of the aggregate behavior associated with several populations. The challenge arises from the fact that the employed techniques for analyzing the mixing times of this process, that is, Sobolev constants, rely heavily on the structure of this underlying state space.
II. SEMIANONYMOUS POTENTIAL GAMES
Consider a game with agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ N has a finite action set denoted by A i and a utility function U i : A → R, where A = i∈N A i denotes the set of joint actions. We express an action profile a ∈ A as (a i , a −i ) where a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the actions of all agents other than agent i. We denote a game G by the tuple G = (N, {A i } i∈N , {U i } i∈N ). 1 Semianonymous potential games can be viewed as a cross between a potential game and a finite population game [6] . 2 For brevity, we refer to 
represent all possible aggregate action assignments for the agents within population N . Here, the utility function of any agent i ∈ N can be expressed as a lowerdimensional function of the formŪ i :
More specifically, the utility associated with agent i for an action profile a = (a i , a −i ) ∈ A is of the form
where
The operator ·| X captures each population's aggregate behavior in an action profile ·. 3) There exists a potential function φ : X → R such that for any a ∈ A and agent i ∈ N with action a i ∈ A i
If each agent i ∈ N is alone in its respective partition, the definition of semianonymous potential games is equivalent to that of exact potential games in [20] . Example 1 (Congestion Games [4] ): Consider a congestion game with players N = {1, . . . , n} and roads R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k }. Each road r ∈ R is associated with a congestion function C r : Z + → R, where C r (k) is the congestion on road r with k total users. The action set of each player i ∈ N represents the set of paths connecting player i's source and destination, and has the form A i ⊆ 2 R . The utility function of each player i ∈ N is given by
where |a| r = |{j ∈ N : r ∈ a j }| is the number of players in joint action a whose path contains road r. This game is a potential game with potential function φ :
When the players' action sets are symmetric, that is, A i = A j for all agents i, j ∈ N , then a congestion game is a semianonymous potential game with a single population. Such games, also referred to as anonymous potential games, are the focus of [23] . When the players' action sets are asymmetric, that is, A i = A j for at least one pair of agents i, j ∈ N , then a congestion game is a semianonymous potential game where populations consist of agents with identical path choices. The results in [23] are not proven to hold for such settings.
The following example highlights issues that arise when transitioning from a single population to multiple populations.
Example 2: Consider a resource allocation game with n players and three resources R = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }. Let n be even and divide players evenly into populations N 1 and N 2 . Suppose that players in N 1 may select exactly one resource from {r 1 , r 2 }, and players in N 2 may select exactly one resource from {r 2 , r 3 }. The welfare garnered at each resource depends on how many players have selected that resource; the resourcespecific welfare functions are
where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} represents the number of agents selecting a given resource. The total system welfare is
for any a ∈ A, where |a| r represents the number of agents selecting resource r under action profile a. Assign each agent's utility according to its marginal contribution to the system-level welfare: for agent i and action profile a
where ∅ indicates that player i did not select a resource. The marginal contribution utility in (6) ensures that the resulting game is a potential game with potential function W [25] . If the agents had symmetric action sets, that is, if A i = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 } for all i ∈ N , then this game has exactly one Nash equilibrium with n/2 players at resource r 1 and n/2 players at resource r 2 . This Nash equilibrium corresponds to the optimal allocation.
In contrast, the two population scenarios above have many Nash equilibria, two of which are: 1) an optimal Nash equilibrium in which all players from N 1 select resource r 1 and all players from N 2 select resource r 2 , and 2) a suboptimal Nash equilibrium in which all players from N 1 select resource r 2 and all players from N 2 select resource r 3 . This large number of equilibria will significantly slow any equilibrium selection process, such as log-linear learning and its variants.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Example 2 invites the question: can a small amount of heterogeneity break down the fast convergence results of [23] ? In this section, we present a variant of log-linear learning [5] that extends the algorithm for single populations in [23] . In Theorem 1, we prove that for any semianonymous potential game, our algorithm ensures 1) the potential associated with asymptotic behavior is close to the maximum and 2) the convergence time grows roughly linearly in the number of agents for a fixed number of populations. In Theorem 2, we show that these guarantees still hold when agents are permitted to enter and exit the game. An algorithm which converges quickly to the potential function maximizer is useful for multiagent systems because agent objective functions can often be designed so that the potential function is identical to the system objective function as in Example 2.
A. Modified Log-Linear Learning
The following modification of the log-linear learning algorithm extends the algorithm in [23] . Let a(t) ∈ A be the joint action at time t ≥ 0. Each agent i ∈ N updates its action upon ticks of a Poisson clock with rate αn/z i (t), where
and α > 0 is a design parameter which dictates the expected total update rate. A player's update rate is higher if he is not using a common action within his population. To continually modify his clock rate, each player must know the value of z i (t), that is, the number of players within his population sharing his action choice, for all t ∈ R. In many cases, agents also need this information to evaluate their utilities, for example, when players' utilities are their marginal contribution to the total welfare, as in Example 2.
When player i's clock ticks, he chooses action a i ∈Ā p(i) = A i probabilistically according to
for any a i ∈ A i , where a i (t + ) indicates the agent's revised action and β is a design parameter that determines how likely an agent is to choose a high payoff action. As β → ∞, payoff maximizing actions are chosen, and as β → 0, agents choose from their action sets with uniform probability. The new joint action is of the form a(t
+ is the time immediately before agent i's update occurs. For a discrete time implementation of this algorithm and a comparison with the algorithm in [23] , please see Appendix B.
The expected number of updates per second for the continuous time implementation of our modified log-linear learning algorithm is lower bounded by mαn and upper bounded by
To achieve an expected update rate at least as fast as the standard log-linear learning update rate, that is, at least n per second, we set α ≥ 1/m. These dynamics define an ergodic, reversible Markov process for any α > 0.
B. Semianonymous Potential Games
Theorem 1 bounds the convergence time for modified loglinear learning in a semianonymous potential game and extends the results of [23] to semianonymous potential games. For notational simplicity, define s :
be a semianonymous potential game with aggregate state space X and potential function φ : X → [0, 1]. Suppose agents play according to the modified log-linear learning algorithm described above, and the following conditions are met:
1) The potential function is λ-Lipschitz, that is, there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
2) The number of players within each population is sufficiently large
For any fixed ε ∈ (0, 1), if β is sufficiently large, i.e.,
where c 1 is a constant that depends only on s. We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix C. This theorem explicitly highlights the role of system heterogeneity, that is, m > 1 distinct populations, on convergence times of the process. For the case when m = 1, Theorem 1 recovers the results of [23] .
Observe that for a fixed number of populations, the convergence time grows as n log log n. Furthermore, note that a small amount of system heterogeneity does not have a catastrophic impact on worst-case convergence times as suggested by Example 2.
It is important to note that our bound is exponential in the number of populations and in the total number of actions. Therefore, our results do not guarantee fast convergence with respect to these parameters. However, our convergence rate bounds may be conservative in this regard. Furthermore, as we will show in Section IV, a significantly smaller value of β may often be chosen in order to further speed convergence while still retaining the asymptotic properties guaranteed in (9).
C. Time-Varying Semianonymous Potential Games
In this section, we consider a trajectory of semi-anonymous potential games to model the scenario where agents enter and exit the system over time
where, for all t ∈ R + , the game G t is a semianonymous potential game, and the set of active players N t is a finite subset of N. We refer to each agent i ∈ N \ N t as inactive; an inactive agent has action set A j . We write the fixed action set for players in the jth population asĀ j .
Theorem 2: Let G be a trajectory of semianonymous potential games with state space X and time-invariant potential function φ : X → [0, 1]. Suppose agents play according to the modified log-linear learning algorithm and Conditions 1) and 2) of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1) and assume that parameter β satisfies (8) and the following additional conditions are met:
3) for all t ∈ R + , the number of players satisfies
5) there exists a constant
such that for any t 1 , t 2 with
and
, that is, agents may not switch populations over this interval. Here, c 0 and c 1 do not depend on the number of players and, hence, the constant Λ does not depend on n.
Then
for all
Theorem 2 states that if player entry and exit rates are sufficiently slow as in Condition 5), then the convergence time of our algorithm is roughly linear in the number of players. However, the established bound grows quickly with the number of populations. Note that the selection of parameter β impacts convergence time, as reflected in (16) : larger β tends to slow convergence. However, the minimum β necessary to achieve an expected potential near the maximum, as in (15), is independent of the number of players, as given in (8) . The proof of Theorem 2 follows a similar structure to the proof of [23, Theorem 4] and is hence omitted for brevity. The significant technical differences arise due to differences in the size of the state space when m > 1. These differences give rise to Condition 4) in our theorem.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider resource allocation games with a similar structure to Example 2. In each case, the agents' utility functions are defined by their marginal contribution to the system welfare W as in (6) . Hence, each example is a potential game with potential function W .
The modified log-linear learning defines an ergodic, continuous time Markov chain; we denote its transition kernel by P and its stationary distribution by π. For relevant preliminaries on Markov chains, please refer to Appendix A, and for a precise definition of the transition kernel and stationary distribution associated with modified log-linear learning, please refer to Appendices B and C.
Unless otherwise specified, we consider games with n players distributed evenly into populations N 1 and N 2 . There are three resources R = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }. Players in population N 1 may choose a single resource from {r 1 , r 2 } and players in population N 2 may choose a single resource from {r 2 , r 3 }. We represent a state by Welfare functions for each resource depend only on the number of players choosing that resource, and are specified in each example. The system welfare for a given state is the sum of the welfare garnered at each resource, i.e.,
Player utilities are their marginal contribution to the total welfare W as in (6) .
In Example 3, we directly the compute convergence times as in Theorem 1
for modified log-linear learning, the variant of [23] , and standard log-linear learning. This direct analysis is possible due to the example's relatively small state space. Example 3: Here, we compare convergence times of our log-linear learning variant, the variant of [23] , and standard log-linear learning. The transition kernels for each process are described in detail in Appendix B.
Starting with the setup described before, we add a third population N 3 . Agents in population N 3 contribute nothing to the system welfare and may only choose resource r 2 . Because the actions of agents in population N 3 are fixed, we represent states by aggregate actions of agents in populations N 1 and N 2 as in (17) 
Our goal in this example is to achieve an expected total welfare that is within 98% of the maximum welfare.
We fix the number of players in populations N 1 and N 2 at n 1 = n 2 = 7, and vary the number of players in population n 3 to examine the sensitivity of each algorithm's convergence rate to the size of N 3 .
In our variant of log linear learning, increasing the size of population N 3 does not change the probability that a player from population N 1 or N 2 will update next. However, for standard log-linear learning and for the variant in [23] , increasing the size of population N 3 significantly decreases the probability that players from N 1 or N 2 who are currently choosing resource r 2 will be selected for update. 4 We select β in all cases so that as t → ∞, the expected welfare associated with the resulting stationary distribution is within 98% of its maximum. Then, we examine the time it takes to come within ε = 0.05 of this expected welfare. We multiply convergence times by the number of players n to analyze the expected number of updates required to reach the desired welfare. These numbers represent the convergence times when the expected total number of updates per unit time is held constant as n increases. Table I depicts β values and the expected numbers of updates.
For both log-linear learning and our modification, the required β to reach an expected welfare within 98% of the maximum welfare is independent of n 3 and can be computed using the expressions
These stationary distributions can be verified using reversibility arguments with the standard and modified log-linear learning probability transition kernels, defined in [23] and Appendix B, respectively. Unlike standard log-linear learning and our variant, the required β to reach an expected welfare of 98% 4 Recall that in our log-linear learning variant and the one introduced in [23] , an updating player chooses a new action according to (7) ; the algorithms differ only in agents' update rates. In our algorithm, an agent i in population N j 's update rate is αn/z j i (t), where z j i (t) is the number of agents from population j playing the same action as agent i at time t. In the algorithm in [23] , agent i's update rate is αn/z i (t), wherez i (t) is the total number of agents playing the same action as agent i. of maximum for the log-linear learning variant of [23] does change with n 3 . For each value of n, we use the probability transition matrix to determine the necessary values of β which yield an expected welfare of 98% of its maximum. Our algorithm converges to the desired expected welfare in fewer updates than both alternate algorithms for all tested values of n 3 , showing that convergence rates for log linear learning and the variant from [23] are both more sensitive to the number of players in population 3 than our algorithm. 5 We are able to determine convergence times in Example 3 using each algorithm's probability transition matrix P , because the state space is relatively small. Here, we directly compute the distance of distribution μ(t) = μ(0)P t to the stationary distributions π LLL and π MLLL for the selected values of β, where P and π. Examples 4 and 6, however, have significantly larger state spaces, making similar computations with the probability transition matrix unrealistic. Thus, instead of computing convergence times as in (18) we repeatedly simulate our algorithm from a worst case initial state and approximate convergence times based on average behavior. This method does not directly give the convergence time of Theorem 1, but the average performance over a sufficiently large number of simulations is expected to reflect expected behavior predicted by the probability transition matrix.
Example 4: In this example, we consider a scenario similar to the previous example, without the third population, that is, agents are evenly divided into two populations N 1 and N 2 ; we allow the total number of agents to vary. The agents in N 1 may choose either resource r 1 or r 2 , and agents in N 2 may choose 5 A high update rate for players in population N 3 was undesirable because they contribute no value. While this example may seem contrived, mild variations would exhibit similar behavior. For example, consider a scenario in which a relatively large population that contributes little to the total welfare may choose from multiple resources. either resource r 2 or r 3 . We consider welfare functions of the following form: 
Here, the global welfare optimizing allocation is a i = r 2 for all i ∈ N , that is, x opt = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0). Similar to Example 2, this example has many Nash equilibria, two of which are x opt and x ne = (1/2, 0, 0, 1/2). We simulated our algorithm with α = 1/4 starting from the inefficient Nash equilibrium x ne . Here, β is chosen to yield an expected steady-state welfare equal to 90% of the maximum. We examine the time it takes the average welfare to come within ε = 0.05 of this expected welfare.
Simulation results are shown in Fig. 1 averaged over 2000 simulations with n ranging from 4 to 100. Average convergence times are bounded below by 2n log log n for all values of n, and are bounded above by 4n log log n when n > 30. These results support Theorem 1.
Example 5: In this example, we investigate convergence times for modified log-linear learning when agents have larger action sets. We consider the situation where n agents are divided into two populations N 1 and N 2 . Agents in N 1 may choose from resources in A 1 = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k }, and agents in population N 2 may choose from resources in A 2 = {r k , r k+1 , . . . , r 2k−1 }, that is, each agent may choose from k different resources, and the two populations share resource r k . Suppose resource welfare functions are and suppose agents' utilities are given by their marginal contribution to the total welfare, as in (6) . We allow k to vary between 5 and 15, and n to vary between 4 and 50. The welfare maximizing configuration is for all agents to choose resource r k ; however, when all agents in populations N 1 and N 2 choose resources r j and r , respectively, with j, = k, this represents an inefficient Nash equilibrium. Along any path from this type of inefficient Nash equilibrium to the optimal configuration, when n ≥ 4, at least (n + 4)/8 agents must make a utility-decreasing decision to move to resource r k . Moreover, the additional resources are all alternative suboptimal choices that each agent could make when revising its action; these alternate choices further slow convergence times. Fig. 2 shows the average time it takes to reach a configuration whose welfare is 90% of the maximum, starting from an inefficient Nash equilibrium where all agents in N 1 choose resource r 1 and all agents in N 2 choose resource r 2k−1 . Parameter β is selected so that the expected welfare is at least 90% of the maximum in the limit as t → ∞. For each value of k, convergence times remain approximately linear in the number of agents, supporting Theorem 1. 6 In Example 6, we compare convergence times for standard and modified log-linear learning in a sensor-target assignment problem.
Example 6 (Sensor-Target Assignment): In this example, we assign a collection of mobile sensors to four regions. Each region contains a single target, and the sensor assignment should maximize the probability of detecting the targets, weighted by their values. The targets in regions R = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 } have values
respectively. Three types of sensors will be used to detect the targets: strong, moderate, and weak. Detection probabilities of these three sensor types are
The numbers of strong and weak sensors are n s = 1 and n m = 5. We vary the number of weak sensors n w . The expected welfare for area r i is the detection probability of the collection of sensors located at r i weighted by the value of target i
where k s , k m , and k w represent the number of strong, moderate, and weak sensors located at region r i . The total expected welfare for configuration a is We assign agents' utilities according to their marginal contributions to the total welfare W , as in (6). Our goal is to reach 98% of the maximum welfare. We set the initial state to be a worst-case Nash equilibrium. 7 6 In this example, convergence times appear super-linear in the size of the populations' action sets. Note that the bound in (10) is exponential in the sum of the sizes of each population's action set. Fast convergence with respect to parameter s warrants future investigation; in particular, convergence rates for our log-linear learning variant may be significantly faster than suggested in (10) under certain mild restrictions on resource welfare functions (e.g., submodularity) or for alternate log-linear learning variants (e.g., binary loglinear learning [3] , [17] ). 7 The initial configuration is chosen by assigning weak agents to the highest value targets and then assigning strong agents to lower value targets. In particular, agents are assigned in the order of weakest to strongest according to their largest possible marginal contribution. This constitutes an inefficient Nash equilibrium. As a similar example, consider a situation with two sensors with detection probabilities p 1 = 0.5 and p 2 = 1, and two targets with values v 1 = 2 and v 2 = 1. The assignment (sensor 1 → target 1, sensor 2 → target 2) is an inefficient Nash equilibrium, whereas the opposite assignment is optimal. The large state space makes it infeasible to directly compute a stationary distribution and, hence, also infeasible to compute values of β that will yield precisely the desired expected welfare. Thus, we use simulations to estimate the β which yields an expected welfare of 98% of the maximum. (26) and (25) . We fix the number of strong and moderate sensors and vary the number of weak sensors. This figure shows the average time it takes for the average welfare to reach 98% of maximum. The average is taken over 1000 iterations, and convergence times correspond to a global update rate of 1 per second. Error bars show standard deviations of the convergence times.
To approximate convergence times, we simulate each algorithm with the chosen β value 8 and compute a running average of the total welfare over 1000 simulations. In Fig. 3 , we show the average number of iterations necessary to reach 98% of the maximum welfare.
For small values of n w , standard log-linear learning converges more quickly than our modification, but modified loglinear learning converges faster than the standard version as n w increases. The difference in convergence times is significant (≈1000 iterations) for intermediate values of n w . As the total number of weak sensors increases, 1) the probabilities of transitions along the paths to the efficient Nash equilibrium begin to increase for both algorithms and 2) more sensor configurations are close to the maximum welfare. Hence, convergence times for both algorithms decrease as n w increases.
This sensor-target assignment problem does not display worstcase convergence times with respect to the number of agents for either algorithm. However, it demonstrates a situation where our modification can have an advantage over standard log-linear learning. In log-linear learning, the probability that the strong sensor will update next decreases significantly as the number of agents grows. In modified log-linear learning, this probability remains fixed. This property is desirable for this particular sensor-target assignment problem, since the single strong sensor contributes significantly to the total system welfare. 8 To approximate the value of β which yields the desired steady-state welfare of 98% of maximum, we simulated the standard and modified versions of loglinear learning for 1 × 10 6 iterations for a range of β values. We then selected the β which yields an average welfare closest to the desired welfare during the final 5000 iterations. Note that we could instead set β according to (8) for the modified log-linear learning algorithm; however, in order to compare convergence times of modified and standard log-linear learning, we chose β to approximately achieve the same expected welfare for both algorithms.
V. CONCLUSION
We have extended the results of [23] to define dynamics for a class of semianonymous potential games whose player utility functions may be written as functions of aggregate behavior within each population. For games with a fixed number of actions and a fixed number of populations, the time it takes to come arbitrarily close to a potential function maximizer is linear in the number of players. This convergence time remains linear in the initial number of players even when players are permitted to enter and exit the game, provided they do so at a sufficiently slow rate.
APPENDIX

A. Markov Chain Preliminaries
A continuous time Markov chain {Z t } t≥0 over a finite state space Ω may be written in terms of a corresponding discrete time chain with transition matrix M [22] , where the distribution μ(t) over Ω evolves as
where we refer to M as the kernel of the process Z t and μ(0) ∈ Δ(Ω) is the initial distribution.
The following definitions and theorems are taken from [22] and [23] . Let μ, ν be measures on the finite state space Ω. Total variation distance is defined as
is defined to be the relative entropy between μ and ν. The total variation distance between two distributions can be bounded using the relative entropy
For a continuous time Markov chain with kernel M and stationary distribution π, the distribution μ(t) obeys
where ρ(M ) is the Sobolev constant of M , defined by
with
Here, E π denotes the expectation with respect to stationary distribution π. For a Markov chain with initial distribution μ(0) and stationary distribution π, the total variation and relative entropy mixing times are
respectively. From [22] , Corollary 2.6 and Remark 2.11
where π min := min x∈Ω π x . Applying (30)
Hence, a lower bound on the Sobolev constant yields an upper bound on the mixing time for the Markov chain.
B. Notation and Problem Formulation: Stationary Semianonymous Potential Games
The following Markov chain M over state space X is the kernel of the continuous time-modified log-linear learning process for stationary semianonymous potential games. Define uniformly at random to update according to (7) . That is, transition to (x j + (1/n)(e j − e k j ), x −j ) with probability
for each ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s j }. 9 Agents' update rates are the only difference between our algorithm, standard log-linear learning, and the log-linear learning variant of [23] . In standard loglinear learning, players have uniform and constant clock rates. In our variant and the variant of [23] , agents' update rates vary with the state. For the algorithm in [23] , agent i's update rate is αn/z i (t), wherez i (t) is the total number of players selecting the same action as agent i. The discrete time kernel of this process is as follows [23] : 1) select an action a i ∈ ∪ i∈N A i uniformly at random and 2) select a player who is currently playing action a i uniformly at random. This player updates its action according to (7) . The two algorithms differ when at least two populations have overlapping action sets.
This defines transition probabilities in M for transitions from state x = (x j , x −j ) ∈ X to a state of the form y = (x j + (1/n)(e j − e k j ), x −j ) ∈ X in which a player from population N j updates his action, so that
For a transition of any other form M (x, y) = 0. Applying (27) to the chain with kernel M and global clock rate ασn, modified log-linear learning evolves as
Notation summary for stationary semianonymous potential games: Let G = {N, {A i }, {U i }} be a stationary semianonymous potential game. The following summarizes the notation corresponding to game G.
• X-aggregate state space corresponding to the game G;
• φ : X → R-the potential function corresponding to game G; • M -probability transition kernel for the modified loglinear learning process; • α-design parameter for modified log-linear learning which may be used to adjust the global update rate; • π-stationary distribution corresponding to the modified log-linear learning process for game G; x 2 , . . . , x m ) ∈ X, a state in the aggregate state space, where
C. Proof of Theorem 1
We require two supporting lemmas to prove Theorem 1. The first establishes the stationary distribution for modified loglinear learning as a function of β and characterizes how large β must be so the expected value of the potential function is within ε/2 of maximum. The second upper bounds the mixing time to within ε/2 of the stationary distribution for the modified loglinear learning process.
Lemma 1: For the stationary semianonymous potential game G = (N, A i , U i ) with state space X and potential function φ : X → [0, 1], the stationary distribution for modified log-linear learning is
Moreover, if condition (i) of Theorem 1 is satisfied and β is sufficiently large as in (8) , then
Proof: The form of the stationary distribution follows from standard reversibility arguments, using (38) and (40).
For the second part of the proof, define the following:
is a constant which we will specify later. Because π is of exponential form with normalization factor C β , the derivative of log C β with respect to β is E π [φ(x)]. Moreover, it follows from (40) that E π [φ(x)] is monotonically increasing in β, so we may proceed as follows: 
, and (42)
Now For case 2), note that λ > ε/4 =⇒ δ = ε/4λ < 1 so we may choose δ = ε/4λ. Let β ≥ (4m(s − 1)/ε) log(8λms/ε). Then 
for some constant c 1 which depends only on s. Then, from (37), a lower bound on the Sobolev constant yields an upper bound on the mixing time for the chain M . Using the technique of [23] , we compare the Sobolev constants for the chain M and a similar random walk on a convex set. The primary difference is that our proof accounts for dependencies on the number of populations m whereas theirs considers only the m = 1 case. As a result, our state space is necessarily larger. We accomplish this proof in four steps. In step 1, we define M to be the Markov chain M with β = 0, and establish the bound ρ(M ) ≥ e −3β ρ(M ). In step 2, we define a third Markov chain M † and establish the bound ρ(M ) ≥ (1/s)ρ(M † ). Then, in step 3, we establish a lower bound on the Sobolev constant of M † . Finally, in step 4, we combine the results of the first three steps to establish (45). We now prove each step in detail.
Then εI ε ≤ ε→0 |C|(σ − m)E(g, g) and hence
E(g, g) ≥ ε→0
εI ε |C|(σ − m) .
Again, using similar techniques as [23] , we bound J ε as
Step 4, Combining inequalities: Using inequalities (53)-(55)
∀f : C → R. Therefore
Combining (48) where c 1 is a constant depending only on s. From here, Lemma 2 follows by applying (37) in a similar manner as the proof of [23, (23) ]. The main difference is that the size of the state space is bounded as |X| ≤ m i=1 (n i + 1)
due to the potential for multiple populations.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 results in a bound on the time it takes for the expected potential to be within ε of the maximum, provided β is sufficiently large. The lemmas and method of the proof for Theorem 1 follow the structure of the supporting lemmas and proof for [23, Theor. 3] . The main differences have arisen due to the facts that: 1) our analysis considers the multipopulation case, so the size of our state space cannot be reduced as significantly as in the single population case of [23] , and 2) the update rates in our algorithm depend on behavior within each agent's own population, instead of on global behavior.
Proof of Theorem 1: From Lemma 1, if condition 1) of Theorem 1 is satisfied and β is sufficiently large as in (8) 
